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Introduction 
 
Attention to the appropriate implementation of public policy is not a new subject for 
the Western democracies. The focus on the creation of conditions for successful 
implementation of public policies became evident during the course of 1970s in the 
USA, and later in Western Europe.  Before then most political scientist focused their 
attention on the policy making and policy content, leaving the implementation of 
decisions made aside, usually treating the implementation process as a matter of a 
technical-administrative nature. Interest in this “missing link” of policy process came 
from the dissatisfaction with such a state of policy analysis and acknowledgement, 
that policy making and decisions taken do not by themselves guarantee their 
appropriate implementation and that it is often in the stage of implementation that 
different obstacles arise which prevent from achieving the initial goals.   
 
During the last several decades, many scholarly works have focused their attention on 
defining the criteria for successful implementation of policy, singling out the main 
variables influencing the process of implementation and their relative significance. 
One of the main issues addressed in many of these studies is observation that in many 
cases the actual results of policy implementation does not meet the initial 
expectations, also what factors account for the mismatch between initial goals and 
actual results. For example, one of the pioneering studies of policy implementation 
produced by Pressman and Wildavsky departed from the dissatisfaction by the results 
of decisions made in the US federal institutions being implemented on the state level. 
Later similar issues have been analyzed in the context of other democratic political 
system, including the problems of policy implementation in the multi-level system of 
European Union, in particular the factors accounting for inappropriate (for example, 
delayed) implementation of EU legislation by the member states.  
  
In Lithuania and other Central and Eastern European countries studies of public 
policies are a relatively new and evolving discipline. Therefore, it is quite 
understandable that studies of policy implementation are still quite rare. One could 
even notice certain parallels in the development of political analysis in Lithuania and 
several decades of evolving debates in the Western academia with shifting attention 
from the policy making stage to the implementation stage, and more elaborate 
analysis of particular aspects such as the role of external factors like the EU, its 
impact on administrative adaptation, Europeanization and other issues.  
 
This study is based on the hypothesis that many problems of public policies in 
Lithuania originate from the inappropriate implementation of policy decisions. Policy 
implementation has so far been ignored by policy makers and analysts alike. In 
Lithuania, most attention is directed towards decision making, motivations and factors 
behind the decisions and their content. However, it is often forgotten that the problem 
which is targeted by the policy decision will not be solved if the decision is not 
implemented correctly; also the process of learning and capacity building will not take 
place if evaluation of the results and the feedback is not ensured. 
 
As a result of too much emphasis on the policy making stage and insufficient focus on 
their implementation there is a process of “legal inflation” taking place in Lithuania 
when new legal norms are adopted or previous ones amended in order to attract voters 
attention or focus on the problems of secondary importance. Moreover, the political 
agenda is overcrowded partly due to the rapid process of transposing EU legal norms 
(acquis communautaire). At the same time, the real problems of the society remain 
unresolved, because too little attention is given to the appropriate institutional 
structure of policy implementation, in particular coordination and accountability of 
public institutions, incentives and motivation, agreement between the main actors. 
Policy implementation often becomes a “missing link” between the policy making 
and evaluation of the results. Due to the presence of this “missing link” not only the 
actual public issues are not addressed, but the society is increasingly skeptical and 
mistrustful of public institutions. 
 
The authors of the study have collected and analyzed material on policy 
implementation in democratic political systems in general, and in Lithuania as well as 
the EU in particular. The study discusses general problems of policy implementation 
in Lithuania as well as four case studies of implementing concrete policy decisions: 
regulation of fixed network services, land reform, Sunrise initiative and 
decommissioning of the Ignalina nuclear power plant.  
 
The case studies have been selected on the basis of several factors – their place on the 
political agenda and public attention, the presence of failures in the process of policy 
implementation, variety of public policy fields, connections with the process of 
integration into the EU and the presence of EU pressure, the potential to generalize 
conclusions and policy recommendations. It should be noted, that although the 
process of decommissioning of Ignalina nuclear power plant has just started and will 
continue for several decades, the case has been chosen mainly because it can illustrate 
how the variables present during the stage of policy making such as a need to ensure 
the broad agreement among the main actors on the nature of the problem and its 
solution can later influence its implementation.  
 
It should also be noted that selected case studies are biased towards the practice of 
bad policy implementation. This bias is not accidental; identifying the problems of 
policy implementation is one of the main reasons for selecting these cases. This 
should also provide the basis for presenting the policy recommendations which could 
be applied to other cases of inappropriate policy implementation (such as education, 
health care or pension system reforms).  
 
The text below presents the model used in the analysis, the variables which are 
discussed and which explain the peculiarities of policy implementation and the main 
conclusions of the study.  
 
Framework of policy implementation analysis 
 
Policy implementation studies are frequently based on the assumption that a public 
policy can be disaggregated into various constituent stages. Even though this 
assumption may be problematic, as different stages of public policy may overlap in 
practice, this assumption is essential in this study of policy implementation for 
methodological purposes in order to determine features and conditions of different 
public policy stages.  
 
In this study the public policy is divided into four broad stages:  
 
1. Issue identification and agenda-setting – in this stage issues and problems are 
identified and included in the agenda. Agenda is defined as a list of issues and 
problems to which the government is paying attention at some point of time, agenda-
setting is the process of narrowing this list of questions.  
 
2. Policy formulation and decision making or policy adoption – this stage consists of 
two steps: policy formulation, when proposals are developed to solve problems on the 
agenda, and policy adoption, when responsible institutions adopt these proposals. 
During this stage objectives, measures, sources of finance and other features of public 
policies are defined together with the framework of policy implementation.  
 
3. Policy implementation – this stage starts after a public policy decision is adopted 
and aims at achieving its objectives during a particular period of time. It is useful to 
draw a distinction between the implementation of political and administrative 
decisions.  
 
4. Policy monitoring and evaluation as well as feedback – this stage involves 
monitoring of public policy and evaluation of its outputs and effects. In addition, 
feedback allows to translate lessons learned during the policy implementation into the 
improvement of public policy. 
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In this paper policy implementation is defined as actions by public or private actors 
(or their groups) aimed at achieving objectives adopted. In other words, each policy is 
a hypothesis concerning the initial conditions and outputs, whereas implementation is 
the process of interaction between objectives and actions implementing them 
(Pressman, Wildavsky).  
 
It is obvious that the success of policy implementation should be assessed on the basis 
of particular criteria. This study employs effectiveness – the extent to which 
expectations have been justified or initial objectives have been achieved – as the main 
criterion of successful policy implementation (the top-down approach). However, the 
unsatisfied nature of policy’s beneficiaries may also indicate unsuccessful policy 
implementation (the bottom-up approach). In addition, efficiency – or the relationship  
between results achieved and resources consumed – can be applied as a criterion to 
determine successful policy implementation, but the main emphasis is laid on 
effectiveness on this study.  
 
It is assumed in this paper that successful policy implementation depends on two main 
factors - the capacity and willingness of policy actors to adopt and implement adopted 
decisions. These factors can be further divided into more detailed conditions affecting 
both the capacity and willingness to implement adopted decisions. For instance, 
clearly defined accountability for the achievement of objectives improves the 
willingness, whereas clear objectives and  functions, sufficient resources and other 
factors improve the implementation capacity.  
 
In relation to stages of the public policy process outlined above, conditions of 
successful policy implementation can be divided into two main sets – conditions 
related to the stages of agenda-setting and in particular policy implementation as well 
as conditions related to policy implementation and monitoring/evaluation. It is 
assumed that the first two stages of the public policy process affect policy 
implementation in a significant way.  
 
The main factors necessary for effective policy implementation and linked to the 
initial policy decision are as follows:    
 
1. clear and consistent objectives, expected results and priorities shared by main 
actors of the policy process; 
2. adequate causal theory linking objectives with measures of policy 
implementation. This theory may depend on social, economic and cultural 
environment as well as prevailing ideology; 
3. legal-institutional structure of implementation, co-ordination and 
monitoring/accountability, taking into consideration learning opportunities and 
feedback. 
 
In addition, a number of factors necessary for effective implementation and linked to 
the implementation stage define the capacity and willingness of policy 
implementation: 
 
1. resources at the disposal of implementing agencies (money, time, qualification 
and skills, the application of strategic planning and other measures 
contributing to effectiveness); 
2. support or resistance from interest groups, society, media, implementing 
institutions and other actors. Support/resistance may in turn depend on the 
distribution of resources, relevant behavioral changes (adaptation pressure) 
and prevailing ideas (policy paradigms) held by interest groups; 
3. changes in social, economic and political context affecting opportunities to 
implement decisions adopted earlier. 
 
In short, one can expect that policy implementation will be successful provided that 
these conditions are met in practice. Although the importance of some conditions is 
widely understood (in particular, resources of implementing agencies), the study 
addresses conditions for effective implementation (in particular, institutional set-up of 
policy implementation) that are often neglected in Lithuania.  
 
Provision of fixed network services 
 
Regulation of fixed network services in Lithuania was unsuccessful until the middle 
of 2002. Most conditions necessary for effective policy implementation were not 
satisfied:  
 
Clear objectives and priorities: there were no clear objectives of telecommunications 
policy, therefore, commitments of the Lithuanian telecom stated in its license can be 
regarded as causes justifying the telecom’s exclusive rights to supply fixed network 
services. To receive more revenue from the telecom’s privatization, the Lithuanian 
government awarded very favorable conditions to the company (relatively long period 
of exclusive monopoly rights, right to increase tariffs by 10 per cent and rate of 
annual inflation, etc.). Finally, no adequate regulation structure was established before 
the telecom’s privatization in order to protect consumers’ rights from the possible 
abuse of monopoly powers. 
 
Adequate causal theory: to achieve implicit goals of telecommunications policy, the 
government opted for the theory of exclusive rights to supply fixed network services 
rather than the theory of market competition. In addition, measures of regulation were 
not applied adequately due to legal inconsistencies (e.g. marginal prices of fixed 
network services revoked by the Kubilius government were not consistent with 
relevant provisions of the telecom’s license) or the absence of legal definitions (e.g. 
the telecommunications legislation provided no clear definition of internet telephony).  
 
Institutional structure of policy implementation: performance of the Ministry of 
Communications in the area if regulation was not successful due to many reasons 
(insufficient independence from the government, participation in the telecom’s board, 
insufficient resources, etc.). After the establishment of the Communication Regulation 
Service (CRS) co-ordination between the Ministry of Communications and the CRS 
was not effective (e.g. regulating institutions did not agree on the re-negotiation of 
“price caps” as well as the introduction of connection tax) partly due to the unclear 
and inconsistent distribution of functions between regulating institutions. Performance 
of the Competition Council was only effective with regard to competition control, the 
exercise of price control was not effective because of favorable conditions set out in 
the telecom’s license as well as inconsistent position of the government with regard to 
the application of marginal prices for fixed network services.  
 
Resources: the CRS did not start its activities until August, 2001. However, staff of 
the CRS did not have relevant qualifications and experience as well as necessary 
equipment in particular in the area of non-radio services. Therefore, the CRS was not 
able to perform its functions in an effective way (e.g. there delay in adopting rules 
with regard to the common use of telecommunication infrastructure).  
 
Support/resistance from interest groups: various interest groups applied their pressure 
on regulatory institutions by different means. After the telecom’s decision to increase 
tariffs consumers and organizations representing their interests started to protect their 
interests more intensively. However, more pressure originated from 
telecommunication companies during the policy-making and implementation stages. 
For instance, during the policy implementation companies’ complaints allowed the 
CFS and the Competition Council adopt significant regulatory decisions. However, 
disagreements among telecommunication companies during the policy-making stage 
did not allow the government and parliament to define the legal status of internet 
telephony. 
 
Changes in the environment: limited revenues of consumers prevented the telecom 
from further increases of tariffs (social factor); opposition forces took advance of 
market regulation deficiencies and the telecom’s abuse of monopoly powers (political 
factors); due to fast technological progress regulation of telecommunications was 
lagging behind the current situation (technological factor). Finally, Lithuania’s 
accession to the EU generated very positive pressure on telecommunications’ 
regulation – the European Commission recommended the government to establish an 
independent regulator (political factor); a new set of EC telecommunication directives 
with a stronger emphasis of market competition provided an ideological background 
for market liberalization in Lithuania (ideological factor). However, the insistence of 
the European Commission on the adoption of an old framework of 
telecommunications regulation by Lithuania before applying a new package of EU 
telecommunication directives is likely to have a negative impact on the stability of 
legal environment and complicate the achievement of objectives of regulatory policy. 
 
The case of land reform 
 
The land reform, which lasts for more than  a decade, has been short of achieving its 
objectives (for example, lagging behind the schedule) for the following reasons: 
 
Clear objectives and priorities: although there has been an agreement among the main 
political actors concerning the main general goals of the reform – to restore the rights 
of citizens to their property and to create conditions for the development of 
agriculture, their positions on the priorities and concrete measures differed. Different 
ruling parties were giving priorities to the different groups of society (previous 
owners or current tenants) during the course of the restitution of property rights. 
Therefore, with changes in government, the reform measures were constantly altered, 
sometimes even halting the reform for half a year (as it was done after elections in 
1996). The final date of accepting the requests for the restitution has been postponed 
many times, the object of the reform was altered as were the conditions of 
compensation. These constant changes created uncertainty and slowed down the 
reform process. In 2001, the restitution of rights to the land has been estimated at 
reaching the progress of 79 percent, the conditions for the competitive agriculture 
have not been created yet.  
 
Adequate causal theory: in this case the main causal link is the adequacy of measures 
undertaken to their objectives – restitution of property rights and conditions for the 
development of agriculture. Although the reform of such a scale is influenced by 
many important factors, and therefore mistakes are difficult to avoid, it could be 
maintained, that the main measures showing the inappropriate understanding of causal 
relations were very limited size of land given back to the owners, limits on the use of 
land, late removal of restrictions for foreigners to buy land (and still existing barriers 
for foreigners and legal entities to acquire agricultural land). Besides, only in 1997 the 
conditions for private companies to undertake the work land measuring were created. 
It is very likely, that the application of these restrictions have weakened the incentives 
for more efficient agricultural activities and thereby complicated the achievement of 
reform objectives. 
 
Institutional structure of policy implementation: the implementation of land reform 
depend on many institutions. First, it was implemented by Agrarian reform services 
and regional privatization commissions, with the participation of regional councils, 
State land institute, Ministry of Agriculture. The division of functions was not clear 
and consistent. Later the first two institutions have been reformed, the responsibility 
for the land reform have been given to the county administrators, the control was 
exercised by the Ministry of Agriculture, with its internal structure being reformed.  
 
In addition, the legal basis of the reform has been complicated. In order for the main 
law on Land reform and the Law on restitution of property rights to be applied 
properly, a number of other legal changes had to be made. According to their legal 
status: a) the Article 47 of the Constitution restricting the sale of land to foreigners 
and legal entities had to be amended; b) the Law of land and the Law of land rent had 
to be adopted; c) the government had to issue decrees on the rules of compensation, 
their terms, the institutional structure and responsibilities of land measuring, etc., d) 
Minister of Agriculture had to order the implementing institutions to prepare 
necessary documents; the county administrators had to determine the schedule of 
measuring works, approve the projects, provide information on land available, etc., e) 
the rules on keeping the files, use of documents and other rules had to be prepared. 
Thus, many the implementation of the reform depending on the coordination and 
work of many institutions including the Parliament, the Government, Ministries, 
county administrations. This complicated structure of institutional coordination as 
well as frequent legal changes following changes in the government further 
complicated and slowed down the reform.  
 
Resources: in the case of land reform, it is not only the resources of implementing 
institutions – financing and qualifications of personnel - which are important, but also 
funds allocated for the compensation. It is the latter category of funds which has been 
constantly lacking. For example, in 1998 instead of planned 50 million litas, the state 
budgetary allocations equaled only 30,8 million litas, in 1999 instead of planned 100 
million litas only 27,3 million litas were allocated from the budget, (later additional  
30 million were provided). In 2000, 27 million litas were allocated, in 2001 it 
amounted to only 15 million litas. If we take into account that the sums allocated had 
to cover commitments made in previous years, it could be stated that the lack of 
financial resources proved to be a significant barrier for the effective implementation 
of land reforms. Currently, about 1,2 billion litas is still needed for the compensation 
of property. Although initially Lithuanian authorities committed themselves to the 
European Commission to disburse this money by 2006, later this deadline has been 
postponed for 2009.  
 
Support/resistance from interest groups: the main interest groups supported the 
overall objectives of the reforms, but had diverging opinions concerning the priorities. 
Land owners union claimed that priority should be given to the former owners and 
those who inherited their rights. These claims were supported by the Conservative 
Party, which have been altering the reform process accordingly after coming to 
power. Although the tenants have not been so well organized, other parties, in 
particular, left wing parties, for example, Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, later 
Socialdemocrats, gave priority to their interests. However, the analysis illustrates 
relatively minor impact of the interest groups on the implementation of land reform.  
However, their influence might increase, although it will be based on the different 
cleavage. Those interest groups, mainly some farmers, who oppose the removal of 
barriers to sales of land to foreigners, could influence further progress of land reform 
and other related policy goals (such as EU accession).  
 
Changes in the environment: Land reform has been in particular vulnerable to 
political changes. Almost every new government has been altering the rules, 
institutional structure and priorities of land reform. This has been slowing down the 
reform and created the atmosphere of uncertainty. At the same time, frequent changes 
in institutional and legal framework reduced the transparency of the process and 
accountability of implementing institutions, thereby creating conditions for corruption 
and abuse (some facts of which have been revealed recently). Changes in economic 
environment have also complicated the reform. For example, after the economic crisis 
in Russia in 1998, the worsening budgetary situation complicated the reform by 
limiting possibilities for compensations.  
 
It should be noted, that with the membership negotiations approaching, European 
Commission has been exercising and increasing indirect pressure on the 
implementation of land reform through critical evaluations in the annual progress 
reports. For example, it was due to Commission’s pressure that the Parliament in 1999 
adopted the resolution committing itself to complete the process of restitution by 
2001. The implementation of land reform until October 2000 was announced to be a 
national priority. However, despite EU pressure, those commitments were not 
fulfilled because of the factors discussed before. Moreover, the EU pressure was only 
indirect because this area falls into the broad category of “functioning market 
economy” criteria and is not regulated by the EU acquis (except for the cases when it 
discriminates against EU member states’ residents).  
 
Performance of the Sunrise commission 
 
The advisory Sunrise commission was established in 2000 to improve business 
conditions. The commission was very productive – it prepared about 200 sets of 
proposals in the first two years of its operation. However, more than 50 per cent of 
proposals were not implemented due to various reasons. Since implementation of the 
commission’s proposals is the responsibility of the government, it indicates policy 
implementation failures by the government.   
 
Clear/consistent objectives and priorities: the purpose of the Sunrise commission was 
to improve business conditions and remove unnecessary market restrictions. 
However, in practice ministries and other public administration institutions also 
followed other goals, some of them clearly contradicting the purpose of the Sunrise 
commission. Therefore, ministries and other institutions did not include measures 
aimed at improving business conditions in their action plans or even proposed 
measures exacerbating unfavorable business conditions. Also, very frequently priority 
was attached not to the improvement of business conditions, but to increasing budget 
revenues or higher control of business activities. 
 
Adequate causal theory: the commission and the government did not share common 
principles and values. To improve consistency of efforts, a proposal with regard to 
principal provisions of the Sunrise commission was prepared. However, it was not 
implemented. Sometimes the commission formulated proposals without specification 
of goals and outputs sought or in the absence of research on business conditions 
business representatives could not always provide clear proposals how to improve 
business conditions. 
 
Institutional structure of implementation: the advisory commission did not have 
sufficient authority. However, one of the main reasons of unsuccessful 
implementation was deficiencies in the multi-level institutional structure of 
implementation. In particular it is necessary to emphasize long process of co-
ordination among interested parties. Moreover, accountability for the implementation 
of proposals was not sufficient, because ministries and other public administration 
institutions were not obliged to report to the Sunrise commission on the 
implementation of various proposals in the first two years of its operation.  
 
Resources: institutions implementing proposals of the commission did not have 
sufficient resources, including financial resources to implement proposals requiring 
additional public expenditure. However, it must be noted that apart from financial 
resources such factors as insufficient number of civil servants or unstable nature of 
the civil service limited the effective implementation of the commission’s proposals.  
 
Support/resistance from interest groups: sometimes interest groups did not agree on 
means to improve business conditions, e.g. trade unions objected proposals 
concerning the liberalization of Lithuania’s labor market, whereas efforts of some 
groups were directed at exposing their competitors’ ‘unfair and better’ conditions 
rather than improving general business environment. Also, frequently there was no 
support for improving business conditions from officials in institutions implementing 
proposals of the Sunrise commission – sometimes implementation was the 
responsibility of officials who earlier carried out measures exacerbating business 
conditions.  
 
Changes in the environment: although the Sunrise commission was partly established 
as a result of changes in the economic and political environment following Russia’s 
economic crisis, frequent changes of the government affected performance of the 
Sunrise commission in a negative way. After every government’s change the 
commission’s activities stopped until its composition and operating procedures were 
renewed by a new government in office. Implementation of many proposals (e.g. 
liberalization of import licenses or changes in the certification system) is directly 
linked to Lithuania’s obligations vis-à-vis the EU or the WTO.  
 
The case of decommissioning Ignalina nuclear power plant 
 
Decommissioning of the Ignalina nuclear power plant (INPP) is not a typical case of 
policy implementation, because it is not implemented at the moment of writing and its 
implementation is likely to take place at least several decades. However, despite this 
seemingly premature analysis there are several reasons for choosing this case study.  
 
First, the analysis in this study is based on the assumption that what is happening 
during the stage of policy making can have an essential impact on the implementation 
process. The case of decommissioning INPP illustrates in particular how important 
the stage of decision making is and ensuring the agreement among the main actors on 
the objectives and measures of policy. As the analysis of this case illustrates, 
disagreements among the main political actors on the degree of insecurity of the INPP 
and the schedules of closing down its two reactors can create difficulties for the 
appropriate implementation of the decisions even before these decisions are made. 
The presence of disagreements concerning the need and the terms of 
decommissioning the INPP provides the basis to predict difficulties during the stage 
of implementation.  
 
Second, the case of decommissioning the INPP is illustrative of the development of 
Lithuania’s relations with the EU. This issue is among the most important ones on the 
agenda of Lithuania’s accession into the EU and has a big symbolic meaning in the 
domestic politics of the country. Besides, negotiations between Lithuania and the EU 
on the issues of INPP provide important insights on negotiations on the accession as 
well as predictions on the bargaining dynamics after the EU enlargement. It is likely 
that the asymmetries of bargaining power between the EU and Lithuania will remain 
after the accession. This is going to have an impact on the implementation of decision 
made in the EU with the participation o Lithuanian representatives. When the 
decisions are made under the conditions of disagreement it is very likely that the 
disagreements will be shifted towards the process of implementation during which 
dissatisfied interest groups will attempt at distorting the implementation to meet their 
own interests.  
 
It is possible to predict now how the factors present during the process of policy 
making are going to impact on the process of decommission the INPP in the future. 
 
Clear/consistent objectives and priorities: one of the most important features of the 
decision making on the decommissioning of the INPP is a clear disagreement among 
the policy actors concerning the decisions made and the interpretation of the 
commitments.  
 
Adequate causal theory: the agreement on the terms of decommissioning the INPP 
depends directly on the estimates of the degree of insecurity of the power plant and 
the estimates of the impact of its closure. On both issues there is no clear agreement 
between the main political actors and interest groups. In other words, the causal 
theory on which the need to decommission the INPP is based (insufficient degree of 
security) is constantly questioned, the alternative scenarios are often being suggested 
and debated. Debates are taking place on the length of functioning of the INPP, the 
possibilities to improve its security and more specific issues such as the length of 
using the cartridges of fuel. Often debates on INPP are framed as debates on the 
future of nuclear energy in Lithuania. Although many experts during the course of the 
decade have been evaluating the security of the INPP, no unanimous agreement 
concerning its security has been reached. It should be noted that supporters of both 
earlier and later closure of the INPP are appealing to the “technical-scientific” 
arguments.   
 
Institutional structure of implementation: several features of the institutional structure 
of decommissioning the INPP make its implementation more complicated. They 
include the multilevel structure of coordinating the actions between regional, national 
and international actors, different sources of funding and complicated structure of 
accountability.  
 
Taking into account that only the first measures for the preparation of 
decommissioning the first reactor of the INPP (although already behind the schedule) 
are made, it is too early to evaluate the impact of resources, interest groups and 
changes in environment on the implementation of the process. However, some 
forecasts could be made.  
 
First, financial and expert resources are necessary for the decommissioning of the 
INPP (time in this case is a fixed factor, although Lithuanian government is linking 
the dates of closing down the INPP with the amount of the financial support from the 
EU). However, it is most likely that the exact amount of resources will be determined 
during the course of the negotiations and it is likely that enough resources will be 
committed. The broader impact of decommissioning the INPP will depend on the 
creation of conditions for the entry of new electricity producers and suppliers, in 
particular the linking of Lithuanian energy system with a larger energy market (first 
Baltic, and later West European or Nordic electricity exchange).  
 
Second, even before the decision on decommissioning the second reactor of the INPP 
was made, the groups opposing this decision have become evident. These include 
interest groups directly related to the functioning of the INPP (its employees, schools 
preparing the nuclear energy specialists, etc.), which are going to experience a 
negative effects. A number of policy actors have been exploiting this issue to attract 
the attention of voters, in particular with the presidential elections campaign 
approaching. The resistance to the closure of the second reactor on the term suggested 
by the EU arises from both strategic calculations of domestic political actors as well 
as their convictions concerning the “true” arguments. Since it is very likely that the 
EU is not going to change its position,  it is possible that the groups dissatisfied with 
the decision will attempt to influence the process during the course of implementation 
or demand certain concessions.  
 
Third, although the process of decommissioning the INPP could be altered by 
changing economic conditions, the most important are likely to be changes in political 
environment. One the one hand, the accession of Lithuania into the EU will reduce the 
pressure of the Union because the main instrument of the pressure – the accession into 
the EU – will be lost. This might reduce the incentives for the appropriate 
implementation. It should be noted, though, that the EU will retain such instruments 
of pressure as financial support or shaming. On the other hand, in the case of the 
negative outcome of referendum on EU membership in Lithuania might also initiative 
the review of the process and alter the process of decommissioning the INPP. 
However, the EU would preserve such powerful instruments as the perspectives of 
EU accession and financial support to soften the negative impact of the 
decommissioning.   
 
 
 
 
General conclusions 
 
1. Complications during the implementation of policy decisions are common to 
all democratic systems. Lithuania is not an exception in this sense. However, it 
could be stated that implementation of decisions becomes the most 
complicated stage of policy process in Lithuania due to several reasons: (1) the 
inherited legacy of the previous political system, where most public issues 
used to be addressed in a formal-legalistic manner, by adopting new laws or 
establishing new commissions rather than focusing on the outputs and policy 
results; (2) the scale and pace of transition reforms and accelerating 
integration into the EU, which resulted in the emphasis being placed on the 
policy making rather than implementation; (3) changes in economic and legal 
environment (such as the impact of economic crisis in Russia in 1998, or 
relatively frequent changes in government). 
 
2. Difficulties of implementing policy decisions can be “programmed” already 
by the factors present at the decision making stage. For example, the case of 
Lithuanian telecom regulation shows that implementation of regulatory 
framework was unsuccessful because of the provisions of the licenses (policy 
goals), providing the monopoly rights instead of conditions for competition 
(causal theory) and delayed establishment of the Communications regulatory 
institution (institutional structure of policy implementation). For the similar 
reasons – lack of agreement concerning the causal theory and policy goals as 
well as complicated institutional structure – the decommissioning of the INPP 
could also face difficulties.  
 
3. Most often failures of policy implementation are explained by the lack of 
resources (financial or expertise). For example, European Commission in its 
regular reports on the progress of candidate countries focuses mainly on the 
budget, number of staff and their qualifications when assessing the 
implementation of the acquis.  The analysis of this study provides basis to 
conclude that although resources are important, the impact of the other factors 
could even be more significant. In particular, too little attention has been given 
so far to the institutional structure of policy implementation. The impact of 
this factor has been observed during all the four case studies. The more 
complicated and unstable is the institutional structure of policy 
implementation, the more important are the mechanisms of control and 
accountability, which are often ignored in the public administration in 
Lithuania.  
 
4. Institutional structure acquires particular importance in cases when such a 
causal theory is chosen which provides significant role for the public 
institutions. This is illustrated by the case of Lithuanian telecom regulation 
when instead of providing conditions for competition among private 
companies, the government opted for granting the temporary monopoly rights 
of the foreign buyer in order to maximize income from privatization. In such a 
case, the appropriate regulatory institutional structure becomes especially 
important (the clear divisions of functions, the stability and transparency of 
policies, independence and accountability of regulatory institutions). One of 
the reasons of unsuccessful Sunrise initiative is the failure to ensure that the 
goals of this initiative (reduction of barriers to business) are followed when 
adopting other legal norms not related directly with this initiative.  
 
5. Often important negative role is played by the inability of the main political 
actors to reach the agreement concerning the policy goals. For example, in the 
case of the Sunrise commission several competing goals could be observed. 
The contradictory signals from the government to the implementing 
institutions for, on the one hand, the need to collect more budgetary receipts 
and tightening the administrative control of business, and, on the other hand, 
to liberalize business conditions, significantly complicated the process of 
implementation. Similar difficulties can be forecasted in the case of 
decommissioning the INPP. During the course of the land reform, when 
governments changed, the policy priorities have been changing as well.  
 
6. In Lithuania like in other Central and Eastern European countries resources, in 
particular financial and expert, are an important precondition for the 
appropriate policy implementation. The factor of time should be noted in this 
context as it is in particular scare resource in the process of preparation for the 
EU membership being part of the competing candidate country group 
(although at the same time, the accession into the EU also plays a role of an 
additional motivating and monitoring factor). However, one should not 
overestimate the importance of the resource – there is always a lack of them. 
What is important, is how to minimize the negative impact of other factors 
under the conditions of scarce resources.  
 
7. During the last decade the role of the interest groups have been changing. 
Their impact on policy making as well as policy implementation was 
weakened initially by the transition reforms. However, in recent years with 
increasing capacity to organize and with the channels of influence being 
stabilized, the impact of interest groups has been increasing. In cases when the 
interest groups can not influence the decisions being made or remain unhappy 
with their content, their pressure on the implementing institutions and 
resulting distortions of policy are very likely. This can be said about the future 
decommissioning of the INPP which, in the absence of constant control and 
monitoring on the highest political level, could be delayed or distorted in some 
other way by the interest groups 
 
8. The resistance of the interest groups and implementing institutions (the latter 
often being the case when their own functions and resources are being 
reformed) could be minimized with the appropriate institutional structure of 
policy implementation. The mechanisms of accountability, transparent and 
simple coordination structure are particularly important in this context. The 
more complicated, non-transparent and poorly accountable institutional 
structure is created, more opportunities there are for the narrow interest groups 
to distort the process of implementation. However, it should be said that in 
some cases the role of the interest groups could also be positive. For example, 
as the case of Lithuanian telecom regulation shows, interest groups can act as 
the channel of information and triggers of legal cases. 
 
9. In some cases, changing policy environment can also delay and otherwise 
distort effective policy implementation. These changes can in particular harm 
the sustainability of implementation results. Frequent changes of government 
has been the most important negative factor in this respect. The negative 
impact of political changes can be reduced somewhat by the appropriate 
institutional structure. However, often changes in government also bring 
changes in the institutional structures of policy implementation. This happened 
more than once during the process of the land reform and during the activities 
of the Sunrise commission.  
 
10. Lithuania’s membership in the EU will strengthen the importance of the 
implementation stage of policy process. The responsibility for the decisions 
made by the EU institutions will rest with the member states’ institutions. In 
cases of implementation failures such sanctions as shaming or financial fines 
could be applied by the EU. Currently, the ability to manage the accession 
process and postpone the accession is the main sanction that could be used by 
the EU. This sanction played an important role in the policy implementation in 
Lithuania from an indirect pressure in the case of land reform to a more direct 
import of regulatory model in the case of Lithuanian telecom regulation to a 
direct pressure in the case of decommissioning the INPP. However, although 
the EU factor increases the stability of policy process and the implementation 
in particular, it does not guarantee the success of implementation. Often the 
EU suggests only policy guidelines, and not concrete legal-institutional 
framework. Moreover, some policy measures suggested by the EU could be 
inappropriate for Lithuanian at the current stage of economic development or 
could be distorted during the process of implementation because of other 
factors (interest groups or inappropriate institutional structure).  
 
11. Although the EU impacts on many public policies in Lithuania, its impact has 
been quite diverse. In the fields of exceptional or shared competencies the EU 
has been having a positive effects on policy implementation not only on the 
sectoral policy basis, but also horizontally by supporting the introduction of 
auditing procedures, strategic planning and increase in qualification of the 
staff). It also strengthens the procedures of accountability and closer 
monitoring of implementation record (although usually focusing on the 
immediate results rather than long term impact). 
 
12. The implementation of the reform measures in the policy fields, where EU 
competencies are only complementing those of the member states (such as 
health care, social protection, education etc.) has been slower than average. 
The lack of the EU pressure can be one of the factors which explain the lack of 
progress in these fields. However, other possibility – that less resources are 
left for these important areas because most of them have been mobilized for 
the preaccession and accession measures – should not be discounted. Besides, 
as it was said, because of the differences in the level of economic development 
between the EU and Lithuania, the implementation of some acquis might 
suffer from the inappropriate causal theory choice or could be distorted by 
other factors.  
 
13. Membership in the EU can make the process of implementation more 
complicated because the number of chains in the institutional structure will 
increase, while the domestic interest groups which are not able to lobby in 
Brussels will most likely attempt to influence the process of implementation. 
On the other hand, more elaborate mechanisms of monitoring and 
accountability (although to some extent depending on the legal activism of 
companies and citizens) can reinforce the incentives for the appropriate 
implementation of policy decisions taken at the EU level.  
